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Abstract 
 
This paper adopts the asymmetric error correction technique to investigate the dynamics of 
household consumption in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. The asymmetric co-
integration testing shows that households in all CEE countries but Bulgaria respond 
asymmetrically to negative and positive shocks. Further, the estimates of the asymmetric error 
correction equations show that despite underdeveloped banking sectors, households in all CEE 
countries asymmetrically responding to deviations but Slovakia exhibit loss aversion. As an 
explanation for this finding, we suggest that to smooth consumption, households in these 
countries deplete their savings.  
 
JEL classification codes: C22, D11, D12, E21. 
 
Key words: loss aversion, liquidity constraints, consumption, asymmetric error correction 
model, Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
Acknowledgments:  I would like to thank all participants of the 7th South - Eastern European 
Economic Research Workshop hosted by Bank of Albania in 4-5 December 2013 for comments 
and recommendations.  
 
 
Note: The views expressed here belong to the author and do not necessarily represent those of the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
After the dissolution of the socialist system, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries1 
started implementing political and economic reforms to move from centrally planned to market 
economies. The legal and financial sector reforms implemented during the transition period 
increased the depth and efficiency of the financial institutions and markets. Indeed, within the 
1995-2010 period, the bank private credit as a percentage of GDP in CEE increased 2.8 times, 
while the net interest margin decreased by 0.9%. Furthermore, during the 1998-2010 period, the 
stock market capitalization as percentage of GDP rose 1.8 times, and the stock market turnover 
ratio increased by 25%.  However despite significant progress, the financial institutions of all 
CEE countries are still inferior to those of most developed countries either in terms of depth or 
efficiency or both (Figure 1). For example, in terms of depth of the banking sector, only Estonia 
is close to Germany and Japan, whereas in terms of efficiency, none of the CEE banking sectors 
performs better than those of Germany and Japan. Among advanced countries shown in Figure 1, 
only the banking sector of the US gives up to the banking sectors of some CEE countries in terms 
of depth and efficiency.  This is not surprising because in contrast to many countries, the US 
economy has a well-developed market-based financial system which compensates the low 
developed banking sector. As shown in Figure 2, the US financial market is superior to the 
financial markets of CEE countries, Germany, and Japan.  
For households, higher financial development implies easy access to financial resources 
which enables them either to finance purchases of durable goods or smooth consumption during 
temporary declines in income. Since previous studies (Shea, 1995, Shirvani and Wilbrate, 2000, 
Apergis and Miller, 2006) find that households in Japan, Germany, and the US, the countries with 
developed financial systems, demonstrate loss averse behavior, then we should expect that due to 
relatively shallow and inefficient financial systems, households in CEE countries remain liquidity 
constrained.  
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether households in the CEE countries indeed 
remain liquidity constrained due to relatively immature financial systems or instead become loss 
averse for some reason. To answer this question, we employ asymmetric error correction models 
which distinguish between negative and positive deviations of consumption from the long run 
equilibrium. Such differentiation allows us to conclude in which countries households are still 
exposed to liquidity constraints or become loss averse. 
The results of the asymmetric error-correction tests show that households in all CEE 
countries but Bulgaria respond asymmetrically to short run deviations of consumption from the 
equilibrium levels. Further, the results of the asymmetric error correction models indicate that 
households in Slovakia are liquidity constrained, whereas households in the Baltic States, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine are loss averse. The finding that only in 
Slovakia households are liquidity constrained does not accord with the initial hypothesis. The 
most likely explanation of this result is that in the short run, after a negative shock, households in 
these countries prefer to deplete savings to maintain the same lifestyles rather than to decrease 
consumption.  
 
 
 
1 In this study, the CEE countries include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of 
the related literature. The third section presents the concepts of loss aversion, liquidity 
constraints, and myopia. In the following section, the threshold error correction methodology is 
introduced. The fourth section describes the data, and the fifth section presents and discusses the 
estimation results. Finally, the last section concludes the paper with the summary of the empirical 
results and their implications.  
 
Literature review  
 
Previous studies examining the impact of income and wealth changes on consumption did not 
differentiate between negative and positive changes as they assume that households respond 
symmetrically to both positive and negative changes. However, there are several studies which 
find that actually consumption responds differently to positive and negative shocks. For example, 
Patterson (1993) analyzes the impact of credit constraints, changes in income and housing 
withdrawals on consumption within the two period intertemporal model and finds that positive 
and negative changes in income have asymmetric effects on consumption. Zandi (1999) also 
finds that consumers respond faster to wealth declines than to increases.  
The neglect of the possibility for asymmetry not only worsens performances of models 
but also leads to the failure to identify whether households are loss averse or liquidity 
constrained. One of the first attempts to resolve this shortcoming belongs to Shea (1995) who 
conducts a test to assess whether the US households are myopic or liquidity constrained. He 
concludes that households are neither myopic nor liquidity constrained but loss averse because 
they show strong sensitivity to negative changes in income and wealth. In another study devoted 
to the US, Apergis and Miller (2006) apply an asymmetric error correction model to the quarterly 
data on non-durable consumption, after tax labor income, and stock market capitalization over the 
period 1957 to 2002. They find that consumers react more strongly to unfavorable news than to 
favorable news. Thus, their finding confirms the existence of loss aversion among the US 
households. Further, Shirvani and Wilbratte (2000) use multivariate co-integration tests to check 
for the presence of asymmetric responses of consumption to changes in wealth in the US, Japan, 
and Germany. Their results indicate that households in these countries are loss averse because in 
the short run, consumption responds more strongly to stock market price decreases than 
increases. Finally, Van Treeck (2008) applies 2SLS and ARDL methods to the quarterly US data 
over the period 1953-2007. The employed specification of the ARDL model allowed asymmetry 
not only in the short run but also in the long run. The estimates produced by the 2SLS method 
indicate the existence of loss aversion, whereas the ARDL method indicates loss aversion in the 
long-run and liquidity constraints in the short run.  
Despite the sufficient evidence on asymmetric effects of negative and positive changes in 
income and wealth on consumption in developed countries, to our best knowledge, only one 
paper examined the possibility of asymmetry in the responses of household consumption to 
negative and positive shocks in CEE countries. Sonje et al. (2012) use the threshold co-
integration method proposed by Enders and Siklos (2001) to study household consumption 
dynamics in four CEE countries. They conclude that in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Estonia, 
consumption significantly adjusts only to negative discrepancies, whereas in Czech Republic, 
consumption exhibits symmetric adjustment to negative and positive discrepancies.  
This paper extends the article of Sonje et al. (2012) in several ways. First, in this paper we 
increase the number of countries to ten. Second, we interpret the asymmetric responses of 
household consumption to positive and negative shocks within the concepts of loss aversion, 
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liquidity constraints, and myopia. Finally, we examine whether the degree of financial 
development explains the behavior of CEE households during short run positive and negative 
shocks. 
 
Theoretical framework  
 
The standard model used in the analysis is derived from the Life Cycle Model proposed by Ando 
and Modigliani (1963). According to this model, the consumer maximizes his or her utility 
subject to the budget constraint, so we assume that at the end of the period, wealth equals to gross 
saving plus interest income:  
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where wt is consumer’s wealth at the beginning of the period, ct is household consumption, yt is   
current labor income, r is real interest rate, and β is a time preference factor. 
Assuming that the utility function is quadratic, real interest rate is equal to a time 
preference factor, and labor income is AR(1) process, we obtain the following expression which 
implies that current household consumption depends on its labor income and wealth: 
)1(ttt wyc βα +=  
where α and β are the marginal propensities to consume out of labor income and wealth.  
Although the coefficients α and β in equation (1) reflect the long run marginal 
propensities to consume, in the short run, there is a possibility of a deviation from the long run 
relationship due to positive and negative shocks. The way households respond to deviations 
depends on such characteristics of households as loss aversion, liquidity constraints, and myopia. 
The concept of loss aversion, first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
originates from experimental evidence which suggests that people evaluate outcomes not in terms 
of levels but in terms of changes relative to some reference point. Furthermore, experiments show 
that agents value changes asymmetrically. In particular, they care more about losses than gains of 
the same magnitude. For household consumption, the concept implies that households tend to be 
more sensitive to decreases than to equivalent increases in their consumption relative to the long 
run equilibrium level. Hence, when labor income and wealth are below the equilibrium levels, 
they smooth consumption through borrowing. However, when labor income and wealth exceed 
their equilibrium levels, households prefer consuming above the steady level to making savings. 
(Bowman et al., 1999 and Kahnmean et al., 1991, Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) 
Liquidity constraints which imply that households cannot maintain their consumption 
level during low income periods through borrowing can occur for a number of reasons. First, 
poorly developed financial markets or existence of capital controls can restrict access of local 
banks to international financial resources. In such a case, banks will loan money at interest rates 
which may not be affordable to many households. Second, the lack of information regarding 
credit risks of borrowers causes the risks of moral hazard and adverse selection and therefore 
refrains banks from providing loans to households or makes banks increase lending rates. Third, 
banks are reluctant to provide or extend credits to households which cannot provide financial or 
real assets as collateral.  Although, under liquidity constraints, households are unlikely to 
maintain their consumption in recession, they can save for a rainy day in a boom period. (Flavin, 
1985, De Brouwer, 1996, Gomez and Paz, 2010, and Beznoska M. and R. Ochmann, 2012)  
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Under myopia, consumption closely follows income and wealth. Therefore, households 
react symmetrically to positive and negative deviations of consumption from the long-run 
equilibrium level (Shea, 1995). Madsen and McAleer (2000) explain myopia by the presence of 
income uncertainty which encourages households to increase precautionary savings when income 
decreases and do the opposite when income increases. As a result, we observe that consumption 
decreases following a negative shock and increases following a positive shock.    
Although the concepts of loss aversion and liquidity constraints represent different 
mechanisms, both of them assume that households respond asymmetrically to fluctuations in 
income and wealth. In this case, the application of the standard econometric approaches such as 
the Engle-Granger two-step procedure, the Dynamic OLS method, and the Vector Error 
Correction Model which do not distinguish between responses to negative and positive shocks 
will not enable us to conclude whether households experience loss aversion or liquidity 
constraints or myopia. To determine a household type, in the next section, we introduce 
econometric methods whose construction allows separating effects of positive and negative 
changes in variables.  
 
Econometric framework 
 
The econometric techniques used to investigate the asymmetric responses of variables include 
such methods as 2SLS, ARDL, and the Engle-Granger two-step procedure with asymmetric 
equilibrium errors (TAR, M-TAR) proposed by Enders and Siklos (2001). Although the 2SLS 
method was one of the first and most popular methods, the use of this approach can be 
problematic.  In aggregate consumption studies, researchers use lagged values of variables as 
instruments for their current values, and for this purpose, they use either longer or shorter lags. 
On the one hand, when longer lags are used, the instruments are unlikely to be correlated with an 
error term, but they can be weakly correlated with explanatory variables. On the other hand, 
when shorter lags are employed, the instruments can be strongly correlated with both explanatory 
variables and an error term. Given that, the validity of lags as instruments is questionable, the 
2SLS estimates cannot be always credible. The ARDL approach is usually used when variables 
have different orders of integration. When variables follow integrated of order one processes, the 
error correction methodology is normally applied. Since variables employed in the current study 
are difference-stationary, and the 2SLS approach is unsatisfactory due to the use of lagged values 
of variables as instruments, the empirical analysis will be performed using the TAR/M-TAR 
approach.        
The Enders and Siklos (2001) procedure begins by estimating the long-run equilibrium 
relationship of the following form: 
tttt wyc µααα +++= 210  (1) 
where ct is consumption, yt is labor income, wt is wealth, and μt is a stochastic disturbance term; 
ct, yt, and wt are I(1) processes. 
In the standard Engle-Granger methodology, we use the residuals from the long-run 
equation (1) to estimate the following equation: 
ttt ερµµ +=∆ −1  (2) 
where εt is a white noise disturbance. 
Rejecting the null hypothesis of no co-integration (ascertaining that -2<ρ<0) implies that 
the residuals of (2) are stationary with mean zero.  
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According to the Engle-Granger procedure, the changes in μt  equals ρ times μt-1 regardless 
of whether μt is positive or negative.  This assumption of symmetric adjustment can be 
problematic if consumption adjusts asymmetrically. A formal way to introduce asymmetric 
adjustment was proposed by Enders and Siklos (2001) who allow the deviations from the long-
run equation in (1) behave as a threshold autoregressive (TAR) process. Thus, the residuals from 
(1) are estimated in the following form: 
tttttt II εµρµρµ +−+=∆ −− 1211 )1( (3) 
where εt is a white noise disturbance, and It is the Heaviside indicator function such that 
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where τ is the value of the threshold which is unknown and needs to be estimated.  However, in 
many empirical applications, it is appropriate to set the threshold value to zero. 
Enders and Siklos (2001) also introduce an alternative method for computing the 
Heaviside indicator: 
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 If specification (5) of the Heavyside indicator is used, the model is named the 
momentum-threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) co-integration model. The special characteristic of 
this model is that it allows the series to respond more strongly in one direction than the other. M-
TAR models can be especially helpful in consumption analysis since households usually attempt 
to smooth any large changes in consumption.  
To estimate the threshold value, we use the method suggested by Chan (1993). According 
to this method, first, the estimated residuals are ascended in the way that μ1<μ2<…<μT ,  where T 
is the number of observations, and then the first and the last 15% of observations are discarded. 
The remaining 70% of observations are threshold candidates. For each threshold candidate, (3) is 
estimated, and the candidate at which the OLS estimation does not suffer from serial correlation 
and yields the smallest sum of squared errors is considered to be the optimal threshold value.    
If serial correlation is detected in (3), then it needs to be augmented with lagged changes 
of μt, such that (3) becomes: 
t
p
j
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where εt is a white noise disturbance. 
After estimating (3) or (6), one proceeds to examining the asymmetric co-integration 
relationship.  First, it is necessary to determine whether variables in TAR and M-TAR models are 
cointegrated. For this purpose, the null hypothesis of no co-integration among variables (H0: 
ρ1=ρ2=0) is tested.  However, since the F-statistic of the null hypothesis has a non-standard 
distribution, the critical values are obtained using Monte Carlo experiments. If the null hypothesis 
of no co-integration is rejected, the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment (H0: ρ1=ρ2) can be 
tested using a standard F statistic. The failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that households 
are myopic.  
In the presence of the asymmetric co-integrated relationship, the error-correction model 
for ct takes the form:  
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where ρ-s are adjustment coefficients, and εt is a white noise disturbance. ρ1 reflects the  speed of 
adjustment to positive shocks, and ρ2 reflects the speed of adjustment to negative shocks. If ρ is 
statistically significant then the larger ρ implies the faster convergence to the long-run 
equilibrium level.  Hence, the large and significant ρ2 means that households are loss averse, 
whereas the small and significant ρ2 means households are liquidity constrained. 
 
Data description 
 
The data set analyzed in this study comprises of quarterly time series of 10 emerging economies 
from Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The data cover the period 1995Q1-2012Q2 when 
available2 and include the following variables: final household consumption expenditure 
measured as total expenditure of households on goods and services, compensation of employees 
measured as total remuneration of employees which includes not only wages but also employers’ 
social contributions, and a stock market index. The sources of consumption and compensation 
data are Eurostat and the statistical offices3, while stock market data come either from the 
statistical portal of stock market data4 or the websites of the individual stock exchanges. All 
variables are adjusted to real terms by the CPI’s and seasonally adjusted by the X-12 ARIMA 
method. Furthermore, all variables are transformed into natural logarithms; income and 
compensation variables are in a per capita basis. 
It should be acknowledged that due to the availability and homogeneity reasons, the data 
employed here do not totally agree with the definitions of the variables used in the Life Cycle 
model, and this fact imposes some limitations on the statistical analysis in this study. First of all, 
the current study uses total consumption, whereas the Life Cycle model considers only non-
durable consumption. The standard theory uses only non-durable consumption because it 
represents a flow variable, whereas durable consumption represents additions and replacements 
to the asset stock and hence may have a different dynamic pattern (Mehra, 2001). However, 
Mehra (2001) mentions that the use of total consumption is validated if the purpose of the study 
is to estimate the effects of labor income and stock market wealth changes on consumption.  
Second, compensation of employees rather than pure labor income is used. Third, the lack of data 
on stock market wealth of households left no choice as to proxy it by the stock market index. 
Finally, since logs of aggregate time series tend to be more linear than their levels, we employ 
logs of variables (Mehra, 2001).      
Additionally, the statistical analysis uses a set of dummy variables to account for the 
episodes of financial crisis and other specific events in the economic histories of CEE countries. 
Following the definition suggested by Hahm et al (2012), we define dummy variables for these 
periods as follows: it takes the value of one when the rate of change of the stock market index 
belongs to the bottom 3% tail of the pooled in-sample distribution (Bulgaria-2008Q4, Czech 
Republic – 2008Q4, Czech Republic-2011Q3, Estonia – 2008Q4, Hungary-1998Q3, Hungary – 
2011Q3, Latvia – 2008Q3, Lithuania – 2008Q4, Poland-2008Q4, Poland-2011Q3, Russia-
2 Bulgaria (2001Q4-2012Q2), Czech Republic (1995Q1-2012Q2), Estonia (2000Q1-2012Q2), Hungary (1995Q1-
2012Q2), Latvia (2000Q1-2012Q2), Lithuania (2000Q1-2012Q2), Poland (1999Q1-2011Q4), Russia (1999Q1-
2012Q2), Slovakia (1995Q3-2012Q2), and Ukraine (2001Q4-2012Q2). 
3 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home (EUROSTAT); 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/main/ (Federal State Statistical Service of Russian 
Federation); http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (State Statistical Service of Ukraine). 
4 http://www.stooq.com/    
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1998Q2, Russia – 2008Q4, Slovakia-1998Q1 and 1998Q2, Slovakia – 2008Q3, and Ukraine -
2008Q3) and 0 otherwise. The dummies for 1998 refer the Russian financial crisis, the dummies 
for 2008 refer to the global financial crisis, and the dummies for 2011 correspond to the fears 
regarding the European sovereign debt and downgrade of the French sovereign rating.   
Before proceeding to the co-integration analysis, the first step is to confirm that all 
variables are integrated of order one (I(1)) processes. In order to test the stationarity of the 
variables, the Augmented  Dickey –Fuller (ADF) test is performed. The lag length for the test is 
chosen by the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). The results, displayed in Table 1, show that 
the logs of consumption, income and wealth in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, and Poland are I(1) 
processes. In the case of Czech Republic, the ADF test indicates that consumption and wealth 
variables are I(1), whereas an income variable is an I(2) process in the “constant” and the 
“constant and trend” specifications. However, from the test details it becomes clear that the 
constant term and the constant and trend terms are statistically insignificant at the five percent 
level; hence, the result of the ADF test specification without exogenous terms is accepted. For 
Estonia, income and wealth variables are I(1) processes, whereas a consumption variable is an 
I(1) process in the “constant” and “none” specifications of the ADF test and an I(2) process  in 
the “constant and trend” specification. However, since the trend variable is statistically 
insignificant at the conventional levels, the consumption variable is also considered to be an I(1) 
process. For Latvia, the ADF test shows that income and wealth variables are I(1) processes, but 
a consumption is an I(2) process. In the case of Russia, wealth is an I(1) process; consumption 
and income variables are trend stationary. In Slovakia, income and wealth variables are I(1) 
processes, but a consumption variable is trend stationary. Finally, for Ukraine, the ADF test finds 
that income and wealth are I(1) processes, whereas the “none” specification considers a 
consumption variable to be an I(2) process. However, a consumption variable is to be regarded as 
an I(1) process because in the “constant” specification of the ADF test for the first difference, the 
constant is statistically significant at the five percent.   
The use of parametric corrections for autocorrelation by the ADF test decreases its power; 
hence, there is a risk of erroneously failing to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. For 
this reason, as an alternative, we employ the Phillips – Perron (PP) test which uses the semi-
parametric correction.  The PP test results, presented in Table 2, imply that all variables, except 
income variables in the case of Russia and Slovakia which are trend stationary, are I(1) processes. 
Since the PP test is superior to the ADF test in terms of autocorrelation correction, its results are 
preferred. Given that all variables are either I(1) processes or trend stationary, the co-integration 
methods can be applied. However, to account for trend stationarity of some variables in the case 
of Russia and Slovakia, the long-run equations of these countries will be augmented with time 
trend variables.   
The presence of the structural breaks can question the reliability of the ADF test and PP 
test results because a break in a trend causes serial correlation which resembles a random walk; 
therefore, we may erroneously fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for series with a 
break (Perron, 1989). However, in our case, the breaks in the series should not raise concerns 
because our finding that the variables are I(1) accords with the previous studies. 
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Table 1 
 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
 
Country Variable None Constant Constant and trend Level 1st diff. 2nd diff Level 1st diff. 2nd diff Level 1st diff. 2nd diff 
Bulgaria 
C 0.9843 0.0259 0.0000 0.3243 0.0000 0.0000 0.6876 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 0.9992 0.0000 0.0000 0.6521 0.0000 0.0000 0.2780 0.0000 0.0000 
W 0.6544 0.0004 0.0000 0.3277 0.0082 0.0000 0.5377 0.0111 0.0000 
Czech 
Republic 
C 0.9715 0.0000 0.0000 0.6803 0.0001 0.0000 0.9990 0.0003 0.0000 
Y 0.9985 0.0110 0.0000 0.3883 0.0751 0.0000 0.7931 0.2226 0.0000 
W 0.7022 0.0000 0.0000 0.6577 0.0000 0.0000 0.8893 0.0000 0.0000 
Estonia 
C 0.9212 0.0000 0.0000 0.4733 0.0000 0.0000 0.9834 0.0997 0.0000 
Y 0.9498 0.0000 0.0000 0.6087 0.0000 0.0000 0.9371 0.0000 0.0000 
W 0.8416 0.0000 0.0000 0.3720 0.0000 0.0000 0.7530 0.0003 0.0000 
Hungary 
C 0.9811 0.0048 0.0000 0.7058 0.0000 0.0000 0.9963 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 0.9451 0.0000 0.0000 0.7213 0.0000 0.0000 0.9913 0.0000 0.0000 
W 0.8912 0.0000 0.0000 0.0668 0.0000 0.0000 0.4375 0.0000 0.0001 
Latvia 
C 0.9310 0.0938 0.0000 0.6489 0.3801 0.0000 0.2116 0.7635 0.0000 
Y 0.9489 0.0000 0.0000 0.6652 0.0000 0.0000 0.9260 0.0000 0.0000 
W 0.7494 0.0000 0.0000 0.2914 0.0002 0.0000 0.7089 0.0005 0.0000 
Lithuania 
C 0.9967 0.0000 0.0000 0.4374 0.0000 0.0000 0.9542 0.0001 0.0000 
Y 0.9798 0.0000 0.0000 0.4040 0.0000 0.0000 0.9830 0.0001 0.0000 
W 0.7804 0.0000 0.0000 0.3909 0.0005 0.0000 0.7430 0.0025 0.0000 
Poland 
C 1.0000 0.0036 0.0000 0.8544 0.0000 0.0000 0.0853 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 0.9733 0.0035 0.0000 0.9776 0.0138 0.0000 0.3490 0.0275 0.0000 
W 0.5965 0.0000 0.0000 0.3126 0.0001 0.0000 0.5544 0.0008 0.0000 
Russia 
C 0.9905 0.0000 0.0000 0.9661 0.0000 0.0000 0.0409 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 0.9769 0.0013 0.0000 0.9716 0.0001 0.0000 0.0407 0.0003 0.0000 
W 0.6103 0.0000 0.0000 0.5445 0.0000 0.0000 0.1794 0.0000 0.0000 
Slovakia 
C 0.9788 0.0000 0.0000 0.7697 0.0000 0.0000 0.1147 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 0.9132 0.0000 0.0000 0.4331 0.0000 0.0000 0.0058 0.0001 0.0000 
W 0.4729 0.0000 0.0000 0.5822 0.0000 0.0000 0.8592 0.0001 0.0000 
Ukraine 
C 0.9998 0.0625 0.0000 0.6036 0.0000 0.0000 0.6735 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 0.9966 0.0000 0.0000 0.3899 0.0000 0.0000 0.5793 0.0000 0.0000 
W 0.7338 0.0000 0.0000 0.2199 0.0006 0.0000 0.9534 0.0012 0.0000 
 
Notes: p values, H0: a variable has a unit root. 
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Table 2 
 
Phillips Perron Unit root test 
 
Country Variable None Constant Constant and trend Level 1st diff. 2nd diff Level 1st diff. 2nd diff Level 1st diff. 2nd diff 
Bulgaria 
C 0.9882 0.0000 0.0000 0.3030 0.0000 0.0001 0.7098 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4886 0.0000 0.0001 0.2780 0.0000 0.0000 
W 0.6858 0.0004 0.0000 0.4506 0.0079 0.0000 0.7853 0.0101 0.0000 
Czech Republic 
C 0.9973 0.0000 0.0000 0.2228 0.0000 0.0001 0.9980 0.0000 0.0001 
Y 0.9913 0.0000 0.0000 0.6780 0.0000 0.0001 0.9572 0.0000 0.0001 
W 0.6889 0.0000 0.0000 0.5261 0.0000 0.0001 0.7575 0.0000 0.0001 
Estonia 
C 0.9017 0.0000 0.0000 0.5258 0.0000 0.0001 0.9390 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 0.9557 0.0000 0.0000 0.6125 0.0000 0.0001 0.9446 0.0000 0.0000 
W 0.8052 0.0000 0.0000 0.5213 0.0001 0.0001 0.7971 0.0003 0.0000 
Hungary 
C 0.9412 0.0000 0.0000 0.7056 0.0000 0.0000 0.9800 0.0000 0.0001 
Y 0.9216 0.0000 0.0000 0.7100 0.0000 0.0001 0.9850 0.0000 0.0001 
W 0.8658 0.0000 0.0000 0.0646 0.0000 0.0001 0.3171 0.0000 0.0001 
Latvia 
C 0.9627 0.0000 0.0000 0.7200 0.0000 0.0001 0.5347 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 0.9232 0.0000 0.0000 0.6041 0.0000 0.0001 0.6124 0.0000 0.0000 
W 0.7490 0.0000 0.0000 0.3672 0.0001 0.0001 0.8064 0.0004 0.0000 
Lithuania 
C 0.9856 0.0000 0.0000 0.4932 0.0000 0.0001 0.9047 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 0.9697 0.0000 0.0000 0.4953 0.0000 0.0000 0.9495 0.0000 0.0000 
W 0.7906 0.0000 0.0000 0.5309 0.0004 0.0001 0.8565 0.0026 0.0000 
Poland 
C 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8392 0.0000 0.0001 0.1109 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 0.9782 0.0000 0.0000 0.9422 0.0000 0.0001 0.0596 0.0000 0.0000 
W 0.6501 0.0000 0.0000 0.3643 0.0001 0.0000 0.6853 0.0007 0.0000 
Russia 
C 0.9951 0.0000 0.0000 0.9681 0.0000 0.0001 0.1351 0.0000 0.0001 
Y 0.9480 0.0000 0.0000 0.9382 0.0001 0.0001 0.0422 0.0003 0.0001 
W 0.5924 0.0000 0.0000 0.3738 0.0000 0.0000 0.0827 0.0000 0.0000 
Slovakia 
C 0.9809 0.0000 0.0000 0.7772 0.0000 0.0001 0.1262 0.0000 0.0001 
Y 0.9177 0.0000 0.0000 0.3951 0.0000 0.0001 0.0052 0.0001 0.0001 
W 0.4532 0.0000 0.0000 0.5587 0.0000 0.0000 0.8383 0.0001 0.0000 
Ukraine 
C 0.9998 0.0000 0.0000 0.5962 0.0000 0.0000 0.6381 0.0000 0.0000 
Y 0.9984 0.0000 0.0000 0.3899 0.0000 0.0001 0.6148 0.0000 0.0000 
W 0.6783 0.0000 0.0000 0.2714 0.0004 0.0000 0.8818 0.0010 0.0000 
 
Notes: p values, H0: a variable has a unit root. 
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Empirical results 
 
Following the previous studies, initially, we test the existence of the asymmetric co-integration 
using the TAR and M-TAR adjustment with zero thresholds. The test results which are not 
presented here for space reasons show that the null hypothesis of no co-integration (ρ1=ρ2=0) is 
rejected, but the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment (ρ1=ρ2) is accepted for all countries. 
The failure to find asymmetry in the adjustment mechanisms should not be surprising because in 
the presence of adjustment costs and possibility of measurement errors, setting the threshold 
value to zero is not reasonable (Enders and Dibooglu, 2001). Indeed, the picture changes when 
we use the consistent estimates of the thresholds obtained through Chan’s (1993) methodology. 
Table 3 reports the coefficients along with F-statistics for the co-integration and asymmetry tests 
for the TAR and M-TAR models with the consistent estimates of the threshold values. The lag 
length for each specification was determined based on the diagnostics checking of the residuals: 
the number of lags is increased from 0 to a certain number unless the LM test finds serial 
correlation in residuals. 
Both specifications of all ten countries satisfy the necessary conditions for convergence 
(ρ1<0 and ρ2<0). Since inference made from the co-integration test based on the usual critical 
values can be incorrect, the values of the F-statistic for the null hypothesis (ρ1=ρ2=0) are 
compared with the critical values specially tabulated for the case of three variables in Enders and 
Dibooglu (2001). It is concluded that the null hypothesis of no co-integration is rejected at least at 
the 5% significance level in all cases except the TAR specification of Russia in which the null 
hypothesis is rejected only at the 10% level. Once co-integrating relationships are found, we can 
proceed to testing for asymmetry using the usual F statistic. In the case of Bulgaria, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment for both TAR and M-TAR specifications, and 
in the Latvian case, we cannot reject the null hypothesis only for the TAR specification, whereas 
for all other countries, we accept the alternative hypothesis for both specifications at the 
conventional levels. Since for Bulgaria no evidence for asymmetric adjustment in both 
specifications is found, this country is excluded from the subsequent analysis. In fact, the 
symmetric adjustment of the Bulgarian households to both negative and positive deviations 
implies that they follow an income trend and therefore are considered to be myopic.  
Further, based on SC,  we determine that the M-TAR process provides the better fit for 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine, whereas the TAR process fits 
the data better for Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia.       
Having found support for asymmetric co-integration and determined the appropriate 
adjustment mechanisms, we proceed to the estimation of the error correction models. The 
estimates of the asymmetric error correction models and the results of the diagnostic tests are 
displayed in Table 4. The LM, ARCH, and Jarque-Bera tests show that the residuals of all 
estimated equations do not suffer from both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity and follow 
normal distribution. At the first glance, it can be surprising to see positive adjustment coefficients 
in some models since a positive error correction term implies divergence rather than 
convergence; however, these phenomena should not raise concerns since they are statistically 
insignificant at the conventional levels.  Furthermore, the statistical insignificance of the error 
correction terms should in no way be interpreted as the absence of the co-integration relationship. 
In fact, the insignificance of the error correction term implies that the adjustment of household 
consumption to shocks takes place within one period (Paiella, 2009).      
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Table 3 
 
Asymmetric co-integration test with the threshold estimates 
 
Country Type ρ1 ρ2 
Φ(ρ1=ρ2=0), 
statistic 
Φ(ρ1=ρ2), 
p-value Lag SC 
LM test, 
p-value τ 
Bulgaria 
TAR -0.764 
(-4.453) 
-0.077 
(-0.179) 
9.930**               0.143 0 -4.338 0.310 -0.022 
M-TAR -0.562 
(-3.211) 
-1.187 
(-3.079) 
9.894** 0.148 0 -4.311 0.0502 -0.268 
Czech 
Republic 
TAR -0.034 
(-0.219) 
-0.706 
(-6.192) 
19.194*** 0.001 0 -6.459 0.273 0.010 
M-TAR -0.944 
(-5.942) 
-0.239 
(-2.130) 
19.920*** 0.001 0 -6.473 0.533 0.012 
Estonia 
TAR -0.815 
(-5.558) 
-0.023 
(-0.119) 
15.452*** 0.002 0 -3.403 0.397 -0.037 
M-TAR -1.308 
(-4.257) 
-0.196 
(-1.315) 
9.302** 0.001 -2 -3.369 0.263 0.045 
Hungary 
TAR -0.059 
(-0.431) 
-0.486 
(-4.431) 
9.908** 0.018 0 -5.276 0.613 0.017 
M-TAR -0.183 
(-1.991) 
-0.897 
(-4.754) 
13.284*** 0.001 0 -5.351 0.352 -0.018 
Latvia 
TAR -0.993 
(-2.144) 
-0.835 
(-3.993) 
10.270** 0.758 0 -1.708 0.057 0.093 
M-TAR -1.587 
(-6.326) 
-0.608 
(-3.881) 
27.540*** 0.002 0 -1.913 0.265 0.074 
Lithuania 
TAR -0.156 
(-0.553) 
-0.905 
(-5.763) 
16.757*** 0.025 0 -4.488 0.463 0.022 
M-TAR -1.421 
(-5.616) 
-0.473 
(-3.082) 
20.518*** 0.002 0 -4.577 0.299 0.027 
Poland 
TAR -0.004 
(-0.045) 
-0.311 
(-4.271) 
9.127** 0.015 -2 -5.071 0.944 0.017 
M-TAR -0.359 
(-4.001) 
-0.085 
(-1.062) 
8.454** 0.026 -2 -5.050 0.491 0.023 
Russia 
TAR -0.386 
(-3.636) 
-0.008 
(-0.057) 
6.609* 
 
0.033 0 -4.615 0.585 -0.022 
M-TAR -0.048 
(-0.499) 
-0.665 
(-4.746) 
11.389*** 
 
0.001 0 -4.744 0.9784 -0.022 
Slovakia 
TAR -0.050 
(-0.192) 
-0.872 
(-4.085) 
9.659** 0.003 -6 -3.782 0.459 0.032 
M-TAR -1.104 
(-4.734) 
-0.259 
(-2.171) 
12.706*** 0.001 -1 -3.751 0.071 0.027 
Ukraine 
TAR -0.148 
(-0.638) 
-0.725 
(-4.568) 
10.636*** 0.047 0 -3.820 0.561 0.027 
M-TAR -0.950 
(-4.828) 
-0.252 
(-1.525) 
12.820*** 0.010 0 -3.888 0.516 0.027 
 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively   
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Table 4 
 
The estimated error correction equations using the threshold estimates 
 
Country Type ρ1 ρ2 Lag SC LM test, 
p-value 
ARCH 
test, 
 p-value 
JB, 
p-value 
τ 
Czech 
Republic 
M-TAR -0.505** 
(-2.095) 
-0.205 
(-1.449) 
2 -6.107 0.206 0.847 0.329 0.012 
Estonia TAR -0.568*** 
(-2.968) 
0.253 
(1.094) 
1 -3.162 0.916 0.370 0.724 -0.037 
Hungary M-TAR 0.173 
(1.647) 
-0.308 
(-1.438) 
1 -5.127 0.642 0.218 0.996 -0.018 
Latvia 
 
M-TAR -0.851*** 
(-3.356) 
-0.012 
(-0.068) 
1 -1.975 0.536 0.288 0.796 0.074 
Lithuania M-TAR -0.659 
(-1.525) 
-0.480* 
(-1.723) 
1 -3.657 0.392 0.755 0.315 0.027 
Poland TAR -0.096 
(-1.239) 
0.008 
(0.178) 
1 -5.941 0.985 0.399 0.072 0.017 
Russia M-TAR -0.063 
(-0.636) 
-0.079 
(-0.404) 
6 -4.352 0.957 0.673 0.095 -0.022 
Slovakia TAR -0.533** 
(-2.435) 
-0.398** 
(-2.356) 
1 -3.383 0.164 0.583 0.609 0.032 
Ukraine M-TAR 0.637 
(1.569) 
0.680 
(1.689) 
7 -2.822 0.671 0.687 0.917 0.027 
 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively   
 
The Czech model indicates that the adjustment term is statistically significant for a 
deviation above the long-run equilibrium but not for a deviation below the equilibrium. The 
magnitude of the adjustment coefficient implies that consumption converges by 50% of a positive 
deviation from the equilibrium within one quarter.  At the same time, the insignificance of the 
adjustment coefficient for a negative discrepancy suggests that the Czech households adjust 
completely to a negative deviation within one quarter.  
In the case of Estonia similar to the Czech model, only the adjustment term for a positive 
deviation is statistically significant at the conventional levels. It appears that within one period 
households adjust by 57% of a positive discrepancy. The insignificance of the negative 
adjustment term implies that the Estonian households complete the adjustment process within one 
quarter.            
The results of the M-TAR model of Hungary show that the adjustment coefficients for 
both negative and positive deviations from the long-run equilibrium are not statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The insignificant error correction terms suggest that households fully 
correct negative and positive discrepancies within a quarter. 
The estimation output of the Latvian M-TAR model indicates that the adjustment term for 
a positive discrepancy is significant at the 1% level, whereas for a negative discrepancy, it is 
insignificant. Thus, the Latvian households adjust 85% of a positive deviation in one quarter and 
adjust fully to a negative deviation within one quarter.   
In the case of Lithuania, the error correction term for a positive deviation is not significant 
and for a negative deviation, the term is significant only at the 10% level. Hence, it can be 
assumed that the Lithuanian households adjust completely to both positive and negative 
deviations from the long-term equilibrium within one quarter. 
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The results of the Polish model show that the adjustment coefficients for positive and 
negative deviations are insignificant. The insignificance of the adjustment terms suggests that the 
adjustment process for deviations above and below the equilibrium level is completed within one 
quarter.  
For Russia, it is found that the adjustment terms for both negative and positive deviations 
are not significant at the conventional levels. The results allow us to conclude that the Russian 
households correct negative and positive discrepancies completely in one quarter.  
The Slovak results differ from the results of the other countries because in the Slovak 
model, the adjustment terms for negative and positive deviations are statistically significant at the 
5% level. Meanwhile, the magnitudes of the terms suggest that the speed of adjustment is faster 
for positive than for negative discrepancies. Numerically, we can say that 53% of positive and 
40% of negative discrepancies are corrected in one quarter.      
Finally, the output of the Ukrainian model shows that both adjustment terms are 
statistically insignificant at the conventional levels. Thus, the results suggest that the households 
adjust completely to positive and negative deviations within one period. 
Generalizing the aforementioned empirical results, we can conclude that the Czech, 
Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian households are loss 
averse as they immediately adjust to negative deviations of consumption from the long-run 
equilibrium levels. The Slovak households, on the contrary, are liquidity constrained since they 
do not correct downward disequilibria immediately. Furthermore, the immediate and full 
adjustment of households in Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine to positive 
discrepancies allows us to suggest that households in these countries prefer to translate increases 
in income and wealth into savings. In Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia, on the 
contrary, households do not hurry to put extra money into savings.   
Overall these findings only partially agree with the findings of Sonje et al. (2012). For 
example, if for Estonia, our results are the same, for Bulgaria and Czech Republic, the results are 
different. The differences in the findings can be explained by the differences in terms of time 
periods, definitions of consumption and income, proxies for wealth, and use of event dummy 
variables. 
The conclusion that households in all CEE countries but Slovakia are loss averse while 
the financial systems in these countries fall behind their high income counterparts is surprising. 
The plausible explanation of this finding is that under the condition of limited liquidity, 
households dissave to maintain the same level of consumption. Indeed, Figure 3 shows that the 
households deposits/compensation to employee ratio in CEE countries where households are loss 
averse are lower than in Slovakia where households are liquidity constrained. 
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Conclusions 
 
The ability of households to smooth consumption in times of negative shocks largely depends on 
their ability to borrow which is subject to the development of the domestic banking sector. 
Households in countries with relatively underdeveloped banking sectors will encounter 
difficulties in obtaining loans, and they will decrease consumption, whereas households in 
countries with relatively developed banking sectors will exhibit loss aversion and maintain the 
same consumption level through easy credit access.  
Given that the banking sectors in CEE countries are immature in comparison with those 
of high income countries, we can expect that CEE households are liquidity constrained; hence, 
they will be unable to smooth consumption. To test this hypothesis, we use TAR and M-TAR 
models and find that, on contrary to our initial expectation, households in all CEE but Bulgaria 
and Slovakia demonstrate loss aversion and adjust to negative deviations of consumption from 
the equilibrium level within one period. Since households’ opportunities to maintain consumption 
through borrowing are limited, they do it through depleting own savings.   
Obviously, there is a risk that if households continuously dissave to smooth consumption 
and their income does not increase in the future, the level of savings will be low. Low savings 
can hamper economic growth because savings determines investment and therefore economic 
growth. 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
References 
 
Ando, A., and F. Modigliani. “The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate 
Implications and Tests.” American Economic Review 53, no. 1 (March, 1963): 55-84. 
Apergis, N. and S. M. Miller. "Consumption Asymmetry and the Stock Market: Empirical 
Evidence." Economics Letters 93, no. 3 (December, 2006): 337-342. 
Beznoska M. and R. Ochmann. "Liquidity Constraints and the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis: Pseudo Panel Estimation with German Consumption Survey Data." Discussion 
Papers of DIW Berlin 1231, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, (2012). 
Bowman, D., D. Minehart and M. Rabin. “Loss Aversion in a Consumption–Savings 
Model.” Journal of Economic Behavior  and Organization 38, no. 2 (February, 1999): 155-178. 
Chan, K.S. “Consistency and Limiting Distribution of the Least Squares Estimator of a 
Threshold Autoregressive Model.” The Annals of Statistics 21, no. 1 (March, 1993): 520-533. 
De Brouwer, G. “Consumption and Liquidity Constraints in Australia and East Asia: 
Does Financial Integration Matter?” Reserve Bank of Australia Research Discussion Papers 
9602, (May, 1996). 
Dickey, D.A., and W.A. Fuller. “Distributions of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time 
Series with a Unit Root.” Journal of American Statistical Association 74, no. 366 (June, 1979): 
427-431. 
Enders, W. and P.L. Siklos. "Cointegration and Threshold Adjustment." Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 19, no. 2 (April, 2001):166-176. 
Enders, W. and S. Dibooglu. “Long-run Purchasing Power Parity with Asymmetric 
Adjustment.” Southern Economic Journal 68, no. 2 (October, 2001): 433-435. 
Flavin, M. “Excess Sensitivity of Consumption to Current Income: Liquidity Constraints 
or Myopia?” Canadian Journal of Economics 18, no. 1 (February, 1985):117-136. 
Gomez F.A.R. and L.S. Paz. “Consumption in South America: Myopia or Liquidity 
Constraints?” Economia Aplicada 14, no. 2 (2010): 129-145. 
Hahm J, H.S. Shin, K. Shin. “Non-Core Bank  Liabilities and Financial Vulnerability.” 
NBER Working Paper no. 18428, (September, 2012). 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." 
Econometrica 47, no. 2 (March, 1979): 263-291. 
Kahneman, D., J.L. Knetsch and R.H. Thaler. "The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, 
and Status Quo Bias: Anomalies." Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1(winter, 1991):193-
206. 
Madsen, J.B. and M. Mcaleer. "Direct Tests of the Permanent Income Hypothesis under 
Uncertainty, Inflationary Expectations and Liquidity Constraints." Journal of Macroeconomics 
22, no. 2 (April, 2000): 229-252. 
Mehra, Y. P. “The Wealth Effect in Empirical Life-cycle Aggregate Consumption 
Equations.” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 87, no. 2 (spring, 2001): 45-
68. 
Paiella, M. “The Stock Market, Housing, and Consumer Spending: A Survey of the 
Evidence on wealth effects.” Journal of Economic Surveys 23, no. 5 (December, 2009): 947-973.  
Patterson, K. D. “The Impact of Credit Constraints, Interest Rates and Housing Equity 
Withdrawal on the Intertemporal Pattern of Consumption -A Diagrammatic Analysis.” Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy 40, no. 4 (November, 1993): 391-407. 
Perron, P.  “The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis.” 
Econometrica 57, no. 6 (November,1989): 1361-1401. 
18 
 
Phillips, P. C. B., and P. Perron. “Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression.” 
Biometrica 75, no. 2 (June, 1988): 335-346. 
Shea, J. “Myopia, Liquidity Constraints, and Aggregate Consumption: A Simple 
Test.”Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 27, no. 3 (August, 1995): 798-805. 
Sonje A.A., A.C. Casni and M. Vizek. "Does Housing Wealth Affect Private 
Consumption in European Post-Transition Countries? Evidence from Linear and Threshold 
Models." Post-Communist Economies 24, no. 1(June, 2012): 73-85. 
Shirvani, H. and B. Wilbratte. “Does Consumption Respond More Strongly to Stock 
Market Declines Than to Increases?” International Economic Journal 14, no. 3(2000): 41-49. 
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 4 (November, 1991): 1039-
1061. 
Van Treeck, Till. "Asymmetric Income and Wealth Effects in a Non-Linear Error 
Correction Model of US Consumer Spending." IMK Working Paper 06-2008, IMK at the Hans 
Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute, (June, 2008). 
Zandi, M.R. “Wealth Worries.” Regional Financial Review, (August, 1999): 1-8. 
 
 
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF 9/23/14 
 
 
Publication Authors Date 
No. 1082: Liquidity Constraints, Loss Aversion, and Myopia: Evidence 
from Central and Eastern European Countries 
Ramiz Rahmanov Aug 2014 
No. 1081:   The Real Exchange Rate and Growth in Zimbabwe: Does the 
Currency Regime Matter? 
 Zuzana Brixiová and Mthuli 
Ncube 
Aug 2014 
No. 1080: Recent Estimates of Exchange Rate Pass-Through to 
Import Prices in the Euro Area 
 Nidhaleddine Ben Cheikh and 
Christophe Rault 
Aug 2014 
No. 1079:  How smooth is the stock market integration of CEE-3? Eduard Baumöhl and  
Štefan Lyócsa 
June 2014 
No. 1078: The Role of the Business Cycle in Exchange 
Rate Pass-Through: The Case of Finland Nidhaleddine Ben Cheikh
  and 
Christophe Rault 
June 2014 
No. 1077:  Skills and youth entrepreneurship in Africa: Analysis with 
evidence from Swaziland 
Zuzana Brixiova, Mthuli Ncube & 
Zorobabel Bicaba 
May 2014 
No. 1076:  Can Dreams Come True? Eliminating Extreme Poverty In 
Africa By 2030 
Mthuli Ncube, Zuzana Brixiova 
& Zorobabel Bicaba 
April 2014 
No. 1074: Bridging the Gender Gap in Entrepreneurship: Evidence from 
Europe 
Elvin Afandi & Majid Kermani Feb 2014 
No. 1073: Can Intra-Regional Trade Act as a Global Shock Absorber 
in Africa? Mthuli Ncube, Zuzana Brixiova & Qingwei Meng Feb 2014 
No. 1072: The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying William R. Kerr, William F. 
Lincoln and Prachi Mishra 
Jan 2014 
No. 1071: Skilled Immigration and the Employment Structures of U.S. 
Firms 
Sari Pekkala Kerr, William R. 
Kerr and William F. Lincoln 
Jan 2014 
No. 1070:  Exchange Rate Pass-Through to Domestic Prices  
under Different Exchange Rate Regimes 
Rajmund Mirdala Jan 2014 
No. 1069: Ailing Mothers, Healthy Daughters? Contagion 
in the Central European Banking Sector Tomas Fiala & Tomas Havranek Jan 2014 
No. 1068: The Real Exchange Rate and External Competitiveness in Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia 
Zuzana Brixiova, Balázs Égert, 
and Thouraya Hadj Amor Essid 
Jan 2014 
No. 1067: Economic (In)Security And Gender Differences In Trade Policy 
Attitudes 
Jeffrey Drope and  
Abdur Chowdhury 
Jan 2014 
No. 1066:  Do business groups help or hinder technological progress in 
emerging markets? Evidence from India 
Sumon K. Bhaumik and  
Ying Zhou 
Jan 2014 
No. 1065: Fiscal Imbalances and Current Account Adjustments 
in the European Transition Economies 
Rajmund Mirdala Nov 2013 
No. 1064: Real Output and Prices Adjustments Under Different Exchange 
Rate Regimes 
Rajmund Mirdala Nov 2013 
No. 1063: The Distribution Dynamics of Income in Central and Eastern 
Europe relative to the EU: A Nonparametric Analysis 
Nickolay Nenovsky &  
Kiril Tochkov 
Nov 2013 
 
